Introduction
In the midst of an age of baffling paradoxes and contradictions, during the heat of a harsh controversy between opposed approaches to foundations of mathematics -infinitism vs. constructivism -it must have been required a new and really penetrating insight to see a way out. Hilbert's proposed solution, at the beginning of twentieth century, was certainly deep and brilliant. According to him, there was no contradiction between classical and intuitionistic mathematics, because the ideal objects and principles that appear in classical reasoning can always be eliminated after having proved some concrete, incontestably meaningful statement. Hilbert's idea was made precise in its epsilon substitution method (see [22] ), a systematic procedure to eliminate ideal objects from classical proofs and reduce every logical step to a concrete calculation. Hilbert's program was to show the termination of his method, or variants thereof, initially for first-order classical logic, then Peano Arithmetic and finally Analysis. As it turned out, Hilbert was right, and some termination proofs have been provided for example by Ackermann (for a modern proof see [22] ) and Mints [23] .
Herbrand's and Kreisel's Theorems
After Hilbert, two other seminal results had been obtained stating that it is always possible to eliminate non-constructive reasoning in two important logical systems.
The first one is Herbrand's Theorem [11] , which says that if a simply existential statement ∃α P is derivable in classical first-order logic from a set of purely universal premises, then there is sequence of terms m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k such that the Herbrand disjunction P[m 1 /α] ∨ P[m 2 /α] ∨ . . . ∨ P[m k /α] is provable in classical propositional logic from a set of instances of the premises. The second one is Kreisel's Theorem [20] , which says that if a simply existential formula ∃α P is derivable in classical first-order Arithmetic, then it is derivable already in intuitionistic first-order Arithmetic. Using Kreisel's modified realizability [21] (or many other techniques), one can compute out of the intuitionistic proof a number n -a witnesssuch that P[n/α] is true, whenever P[n/α] it is closed.
Both Herbrand's and Kreisel's proof techniques are now obsolete, but the meaning of their results is as valid as ever, because it provides a theoretical justification for an important quest: the search for the constructive content of classical proofs. Herbrand's Theorem tells us what is the immediate computational content of classical first-order logic: the list of witnesses contained in any Herbrand disjunction. Kreisel's Theorem tells us what is the immediate computational content of first-order Arithmetic: the numeric witness for any provable existential statement. What is of great interest, in the light of those results, is to automatically transform proofs into programs in order to compute from any proof of any existential statement a suitable list of witnesses, in first-order logic, a single witness, in Arithmetic. In this paper, we shall address the first-order version of the problem -and propose a new solution.
Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus
The two most successful and most studied deductive systems for first-order logic are Gentzen's natural deduction [24] and Gentzen's sequent calculus [16, 15] . The first elegant constructive proof of Herbrand's Theorem was indeed obtained as a corollary of Gentzen's Cut elimination Theorem. Today, that proof is still the most cited and the most used. On the contrary, we even failed to find in the literature a complete proof of Herbrand's Theorem using classical natural deduction. This is no coincidence, but yet another instance of the legendary duality between the two formalisms: as a matter of fact, some results are much more easily discovered and proved in the sequent calculus, while other are far more easily obtained in natural deduction. Since the time of Gentzen, natural deduction worked seamlessly for intuitionistic logic, and led to the discovery of the Curry-Howard correspondence [25] , while sequent calculus was much more technically convenient in classical logic (Gentzen was not able to prove a meaningful normalization theorem for classical natural deduction, whilst he was for the intuitionistic case [26] ). It indeed took a surprisingly long time to discover suitable reduction rules for classical natural deduction systems with all connectives [18] (see also [7, 25] for a more detailed history).
The great advantage of using natural deduction instead of sequent calculus is no mystery: it is natural! When logically solving non-trivial problems, humans adopt forward reasoning, which is more adapted to proof-construction: one starts from some observations, draws some consequences and gradually combine them so to reach the goal. On the other hand, sequent calculus is more suitable for machine-like proof-search: one start from the final goal and applies mechanically logical rules to reach axioms. As a consequence, when analyzing real mathematical proofs so to investigate their constructive content, one likes it better to use natural deduction. Moreover, the reduction of a proof into normal form is nothing but the evaluation of a functional program, and so very easy to understand. The cut-elimination process, instead, is far more involved and difficult to follow. For example, the proof of Herbrand's Theorem by cut-elimination is deceptively simple: while it is rather obvious that the final cut-free proof contains an Herbrand disjunction, it is very painful to gain a step-by-step and clear understanding of how the corresponding list of witnesses has been produced.
Classical Natural Deduction: an Exception-Based Curry-Howard Correspondence
We would like to endow classical first-order natural deduction with a natural set of reduction rules that also allows a natural, seamless proof of Herbrand's Theorem. As a corollary, this system would also have a simple and meaningful computational interpretation. Indeed, we believe that one can say to really understand a theorem when one is able to construct a proof of it that, a posteriori, appears completely natural, almost obvious. Usually, that happens when one has created a framework of concepts and methods that explain the theorem.
EM 1 and Exceptions in Arithmetic
If one wants to understand how is it possible that a classical proof has any computational content in the first place, the concept of learning is essential. It was a Hilbert discovery that from classical proofs one can extract approximation processes, that learn how to constructs non-effective objects by an intelligent process of trial and error. More recently, Interactive realizability [2, 9, 3, 4, 5] has been developed, which is a framework that finally combines the learning idea with the formulae-as-types tradition. In [7] a Curry-Howard correspondence for a classical system of Arithmetic is introduced: namely, Heyting Arithmetic HA with the excluded middle schema EM 1 , ∀αP ∨ ∃α¬P, where P is any atomic, and hence decidable, predicate. Classical programs are described as programs that make hypotheses, test them and correct them when they are learned to be wrong. In particular, EM 1 is treated as an elimination rule:
This inference is nothing but a familiar disjunction elimination rule, where the main premise EM 1 has been cut, since, being a classical axiom, it has no computational content in itself. The proof terms u, v are both kept as possible alternatives, since one is not able to decide which branch is going to be executed at the end.
The informal idea expressed by the associated reductions is to assume ∀α P and try to produce some complete proof of C out of u by reducing inside u. Whenever u needs the truth of an instance P[n/α] of the assumption ∀α P, it checks it, and if it is true, it replaces it by its canonical proof which is just a computation. If all instances P[n/α] of ∀α P being checked are true, and no assumption ∀αP is left (this is the non-trivial part), then the normal form u ′ of u is independent from ∀α P and we found some u ′ : C. If instead some assumption of ∀αP is left in u, one may encounter some instance P[n/α] which is false, and thus refute the assumption ∀α P. In this case the attempt of proving C from ∀αP fails, one obtains ¬P[n/α] and u raises the exception n; from the knowledge that ¬P[n/α] holds, a canonical proof term ∃α ¬P is formed and passed to v: a proof term for C has now been obtained and it can be executed.
EM n and Exceptions in Classical Logic
Our goal is to extend the learning methods developed for HA + EM 1 to classical first-order logic. There is a catch: the reductions we have just described do no longer work! The obvious obstacle is that it is not possible to check the truth of formulas, even of atomic ones: there is no such a thing as a standard model for classical first-order logic, let alone an absolute notion of truth. Is the whole idea of learning bound to fail and be abandoned or it can be rescued in some way? The problem is that, even though classical first-order logic is proof-theoretically much weaker than first-order Arithmetic, in a sense, it is harder to interpret and gives rise to different issues. The programs extracted from proofs in HA + EM 1 explore many possible computational paths, due to the bifurcations produced by EM 1 . When the proven formula is a simply existential statement, either a path will succeed in finding a correct witness or will fail and throw some information which will activate another path. At the very end, a single computational path will find a witness. Herbrand's Theorem for classical first-order logic, instead, asserts only the existence of a list of possible witnesses for the proven existential formula. This must be due to the fact that it is often impossible to solve the dilemmas that are posed by the use of the exclude middle, and several alternatives computational paths are to be kept forever in parallel.
Let us consider again the rule for EM 1 , but now in pure first-order logic:
The idea is still to start reducing inside u in order to produce a proof of C. But the first time one needs an instance P[m/α] of the hypothesis ∀α P to hold, where m is now a first-order term, an exception is automatically thrown. Since one is not able to decide whether P[m/α] holds, the current universe doubles and a new pair of parallel, mutually exclusive universes is generated. In the first one, P[m/α] is supposed to hold, in the second one, ¬P[m/α] is supposed to. What is the correct universe? One shall never know, and parallel reductions must continue to be made in these two universes. In the first one, inside u, a small progress has been made, because a use of the universal hypothesis ∀α P can be eliminated: P[m/α] holds by the very hypothesis that generated the universe, and it is no longer necessary to justify it as a consequence of ∀α P. Hence u can reduce to the term u − obtained by erasing the premise ∀α P of all eliminations of ∀α P having as conclusion P[m/α]. In the second one, inside v, a considerable progress has been made, since a witness m for ∃α ¬P has been learned, again by the very hypothesis that generated the universe. Hence v can reduce to the term v + obtained by replacing all occurrences of the hypothesis ∃α ¬P with a proof of it by an introduction rule with premise ¬P[m/α]. The generation of the two universes is logically supported by the use of the excluded middle EM 0 over propositional formulas, which has the general form:
The resulting conversion for the conclusion u a v of EM 1 is the following:
We see that in the term v + | (u − a v), there is a single bar | separating forever v + and (u − a v): the two terms will give rise to two different and independent computations. In the first, a universal hypothesis has been confirmed, in the second, the same universal hypothesis has been refuted and a counterexample learned: the idea of learning has been saved!
The term u ||| a v decorating the conclusion of excluded middle EM 2
will reduce, in a completely equivalent fashion, to 
is logically supported by EM 1 , so the number of bars in the last application of EM is two, decreasing by one. Therefore, the two universes are parallel, but can still communicate with each other: an exception may at any moment by raised by v + and a term be passed in particular to u − . This will be very useful, since the hypothesis b : ∃β P[m/α] may block the computation inside u − .
The reduction rules for the excluded middle on prenex formulas with n alternating quantifiers -EM n -are the obvious generalization of what we have just explained: for full details see Section §2. The general idea is that the right ∃-branch of the excluded middle always waits for a witness coming from the left ∀-branch. These two universes are completely separated, but inhabitants of the second can receive "divine gifts" from the first, under the form of possible witnesses. The inhabitants of the second universe cannot see how these godsends are produced, and may accept them as manifestation of divine providence. This should remind the reader the copycat strategy for EM n in Coquand's game semantics [12] .
In order to implement our reductions we shall use constant terms of the form H ∀αA a , whose task is to automatically raise an exception: the notation raise ∀αA a would also have been just fine. We shall also use a constant W ∃αA ⊥ a denoting some unknown proof term for ∃αA ⊥ (A ⊥ is the usual involutive negation), whose task is to catch the exception raised by H ∀αP a . Actually, these terms will occur only through typing rules of the form
where a is used just as a name of a communication channel for exceptions: if in u occurs a subterm of the form H ∀αA a m, then in an exception is raised in u | | | | | | | | a v and passed to v ( | | | | | | | | stands for a sequence of n + 1 bars in the case of EM n ). From the viewpoint of programming, that is a delimited exception mechanism (see de Groote [17] and Herbelin [19] for a comparison). The scope of an exception has the form u a v : C, with u the "ordinary" part of the computation and v the "exceptional" part. Similar mechanism are expressed by the constructs raise and try . . . with . . . in the CAML programming language. There is a substantial difference, however, with the exception handling mechanism used in [7] . Here, the ordinary part of the computation goes on after the first exception, and in fact can raise multiple exceptions, one after another, which are all passed to the exception handler; in [7] , instead, the ordinary part of the computation is aborted as soon as the first exception is raised.
Permutation Rules
A problem arises when the conclusion C of the excluded middle is employed as the main premise of an elimination rule to obtain some new conclusion. For example, already with EM 0 , when C = A → B, and Γ ⊢ w : A, one may form the proof term (w 1 | w 2 )w of type B.
In this case, one may not be able to solve the dilemma of choosing between w 1 and w 2 , and the computation may not evolve further: one is stuck.
As in [7] , the problem is solved by adding Prawitz's permutation rules [24] , as usual with disjunction. For example, (u | v)w reduces to uw | vw. In this way, one obtains two important results: first, one may explore both the possibilities, ∀αP holds or ∃α¬P holds, and evaluate uw and vw; second, one duplicates the applicative context [ ]w. If C = A ∧ B, one may form the proof term π 0 (u | v), which reduces to π 0 u | π 0 v, and has the effect of duplicating the context π 0 [ ]. Similar standard considerations hold for the other connectives. Thus permutation rules act similarly to the rules for µ in the λµ-calculus, but are only used to duplicate step-by-step the context and produce implicitly the continuation. Anyway, | behaves like a control-like operator.
Herbrand's Disjunction Extraction and Strong Normalization
The computational content of a classical first-order proof of a simply existential statement is the list of witnesses appearing in a Herbrand disjunction. Why in intuitionistic logic the result of the normalization process is a single witness, while in classical logic it is just a list of possibilities? The reduction rules for EM provide an intuitive explanation of why this list is produced and highlight each of the moments when a piece of it is built. During the normalization of a proof term, the computation is first purely intuitionistic and heading towards a single witness. In other terms, only redexes of the standard lambda calculus are at first contracted. However, the computation may be blocked by an instance of a universal hypothesis H ∀αA a m which the program cannot decide. At that time, the universe doubles, but in each of new pair of universes, the computation goes on and stays intuitionistic. In each of the two universes, new universe duplications can occur and so on . . . . At the very end, there will be several different intuitionistic computations: each of them will produce, as expected, a witness, and the collection of all of them will form the Herbrand disjunction. This intuitive description will be formalized in a normal form property that we shall prove.
We shall also prove a strong normalization result stating that every reduction path generated by any proof term will terminate in a normal form. We shall employ a non-deterministic technique introduced in [6] , in turn inspired by [8] . While the strong normalization result in [7] was obtained by means of a special notion of realizability, we had considerable troubles generalizing that technique. At the end, the non-deterministic approach revealed much more simple to generalize. We thus leave open the interesting problem of defining a realizability or a proof-theoretic semantics for our natural deduction system.
Plan of the Paper
This is the plan of the paper. In Section §2 we introduce a type-theoretical version of intuitionistic first-order logic IL extended with EM := n EM n . In Section §3 we prove the strong normalization of a non-deterministic variant IL + EM ⋆ of IL + EM, which immediately implies the strong normalization of the latter. In Section §4, we prove that from any quasiclosed term having as type a simply existential formula, one can extract a correspondent Herbrand disjunction.
The System IL + EM
In this section we describe a standard natural deduction system for intuitionistic first-order logic IL, with a term assignment based on Curry-Howard correspondence (see [25] e.g.). We extend the system with an operator which formalizes the excluded middle principle EM n .
We start with the standard first-order language of formulas.
Definition 1 (Language of IL + EM). The language L of IL + EM is defined as follows. 1. The terms of L are inductively defined as either variables α, β, . . . or constants c or expressions of the form f(t 1 , . . . , t n ), with f function constant of arity n and t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ L.
2.
There is a countable set of predicate symbols. The atomic formulas of L are all the expressions of the form P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) such that P is a predicate symbol of arity n and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms of L. We assume to have a 0-ary predicate symbol ⊥ which represents falsity. 3. The formulas of L are built from atomic formulas of L by the logical constants ∨, ∧, →, ∀, ∃, with quantifiers ranging over variables α, β, .
The logical negation ¬A can be introduced, as usual, as an abbreviation of the formula A → ⊥ 4. Propositional formulas are the formulas whose only logical constants are ∧, ∨, →; we say that a propositional formula is negative whenever ∨ does not occur in it. Propositional formulas will be denoted as P, Q . . . (possibly indexed). Formulas of the form ∀α 1 . . . ∀α n P, with n ≥ 0 and P propositional, will be denoted as ∀ α P and will be called purely universal; if P is also negative, the formula will be called simply universal.
For deducing the axiom ⊥ → A (ex falso sequitur quodlibet), it is enough to have ⊥ → P, where P is atomic, and the axioms of equality as well can be formulated as simply universal. They will not appear explicitly in the logical rules, since at any rate we shall have to treat a more general case: the computational interpretation of proofs having as assumptions an arbitrary set of simply universal statements, as usual in Herbrand's Theorem.
We now define in Figure 1 a set of untyped proof terms, then a type assignment for them.
We assume that in the proof terms three distinct classes of variables appear: one is made by the variables for the terms themselves, denoted usually as x, y, . . .; one is made by the quantified variables of the formula language L of IL + EM, denoted usually as α, β, . . .; one is made by the hypothesis variables, for the pair of hypotheses bound by EM n , denoted usually as a, b, . . ..
We formalize each instance of the Excluded Middle principle on prenex formulas EM n with n alternating quantifiers by terms of the form u | | . . . | a n+1 v, where a is a hypothesis variable which explicitly appears in the premisses bounded by the EM n rule. We will call a bar any symbol of the shape | . In the following, we exploit the compact notation | | | | | | | | in order to denote an arbitrary sequence of n bars | . The symbol | | | | | | | || | stands for n + 1 bars whenever | | | | | | | | represents a sequence of n bars.
In the term u | | | | | | | | a v, any free occurrence of a in u occurs in an expression of the shape H 
where m ranges over terms of L, x over proof-term variables, a over hypothesis variables and A is a prenex formula with negative propositional matrix or is a simply universal formula. We assume that in the term u | | . . . |a Contexts With Γ we denote contexts of the form e1 : A1, . . . , en : An, where each e i is either a proof-term variable x, y, z . . . or a EM hypothesis variable a, b, . . ., and e i = e j for i = j.
where m is any term of the language L and α does not occur free in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Existential Quantification
where α is not free in C nor in any formula B occurring in Γ. the free variables are a and those of A minus α. A term of the form H ∀αA a m, with m ∈ L, is said to be active, if its only free variable is a: it represents a raise operator which has been turned on. The hypotheses for propositional formulas P of any form will be represented by terms H P , regardless of their being introduced in the right or left premise of the excluded middle. Hence, the letter H stands for an hypothesis which does not "wait" for a witness, while W for one which does.
In our formulation, the excluded middle is restricted to negative propositional formulas, in the case of EM 0 , and to prenex formulas with alternating quantifiers and whose propositional matrix is negative, in the case of EM n . From the logical viewpoint, however, this is not at all a restriction, since we claim that any arbitrary instance A ∨ ¬A of the excluded middle can be proved in our system by standard, but tortuous, logical manipulations (see [1] for a proof). The fact that our system captures full classical first-order logic is not surprising, of course, since every formula is classically equivalent to a prenex one. From the computational viewpoint, in fact, we have directly modeled the most difficult cases of EM. It is quite clear that similar reduction rules for the less interesting cases of propositional connectives can be easily given, since ∧ is just a finitary counterpart of ∀ and ∨ of ∃. For economy of presentation, we delay the treatment to future work.
In the following, we assume the usual renaming rules and alpha equivalences to avoid capture of variables in the reduction rules that we shall give. We also observe that every typed term which has been obtained by an elimination as a last rule, can be written as r t 1 t 2 . . . t n (n ≥ 0), where r is either a variable x or a term H ∀αA a or H P or a redex and each t i is either a term (when r t 1 . . . t i is obtained by an →-elimination rule or by a ∀-elimination rule) or a constant π i (when r t 1 . . . t i is obtained by an ∧-elimination rule) or an expression [x 0 .u 0 , x 1 .u 1 ] (when r t 1 . . . t i is obtained by an ∨-elimination rule) or an expression [(α, x) .u] (when r t 1 . . . t i is obtained by an ∃-elimination rule).
We are now going to explain the basic reduction rules for the proof terms of IL + EM, which are given in Figure 2 . As usual, one has also the axiom scheme:
, whenever t → u and for any context E. With → * we shall denote the reflexive and transitive closure of the one-step reduction →. We find among them the ordinary reductions of intuitionistic logic for the logical con-stants. Permutation Rules for EM n are an instance of Prawitz's permutation rules for ∨-elimination [24] . The reduction rules for EM n model the exception handling mechanism explained in Section §1. , because there is no exception and in particular no witness for P[m/α] to be waited for and caught. Moreover, we remark that the substitution may replace only prenex hypotheses with alternating quantifiers, thus those introduced by the rule EM n .
Reduction Rules for IL
In the term u | v, the subterms u and v are forever divided and represent disjoint computational paths: communication between them is not even possible, because there is no associated exception mechanism. The rules for EM n instead translate the informal idea of exception handling we sketched in the introduction:
1. The first EM n -reduction: u | | | | | | | | a v → u (a does not occur free in u). This rule says that no free hypothesis of the shape H ∀αA a : ∀αA occurs in u and thus it is unnecessary in the proof and in the computation; consequently, the proof term u | | | | | | | | a v may be simplified to u and the computation carry on following only the reduction tree of u. In this case the (or H A[m/α] ), which confirms, in this "universe", the stronger ∀αA. Notice that after the substitution u[a := n] some free occurrence of a in u may still be there (the replaced occurrences of a are only the ones of the form H ∀αA a m); as a consequence, in the possible further reduction of the subterm u[a := n] | | | | | | | || | a v an exception corresponding to the variable a may be raised again. Notice that | | | | | | | | b is a strictly shorter sequence of bars with respect to the sequence | | | | | | | || | a ; on the other hand, we also remark that the complexity of the formula A[m/α] is strictly lower with respect to the complexity of the hypothesis ∀αA.
Definition 3 (Normal Forms and Strongly Normalizable Terms).
A →-redex is a term u such that u → v for some v and basic reduction of Figure 2 . A term t is called an →-normal form (or simply normal form) if t does not contain as subterm any →-redex. We define NF to be the set of normal untyped proof terms. A sequence (finite or infinite) of proof terms u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n , . . . is said to be a reduction of t, if t = u 1 , and for all i, u i → u i+1 . A proof term u of IL + EM is strongly normalizable if there is no infinite reduction of u. We denote with SN the set of strongly normalizable terms of IL + EM.
Assume that Γ is a context, t an untyped proof term and A a formula, and Γ ⊢ t : A: then t is said to be a typed proof term. Typing assignment satisfies Weakening, Exchange and Thinning, as usual. We claim that the reduction defined in Figure 2 satisfy the important Subject Reduction Theorem: reduction steps at the level of proof terms correspond to logically sound transformations at the level of proofs.
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction).
If Γ ⊢ t : C and t → u, then Γ ⊢ u : C.
Proof. The proof that the reduction rules for IL and the permutation rules for EM preserve the type is completely standard. Thus we are left with the EM n reductions.
We first need to prove that for every closed term m of L and EM-hypothesis variable b not occurring in Γ, v, if we set n = (m, b), it holds that
We proceed by induction on the term v. When the last rule in the type derivation of v is an axiom, a rule for EM, conjunction, disjunction, implication, existential quantifier or a rule for universal quantifier introduction, the thesis follows immediately or by simple induction hypothesis. 
where u has some active subterm H ∀αA 
We now introduce the concept of quasi-closed term, which intuitively is a term behaving as a closed one, in the sense that it can be executed, but that contains some free simply universal hypotheses on which its correctness depends.
Definition 5 (Quasi-Closed terms).
1. An untyped proof term t is said to be quasi-closed, if it contains as free variables only hypothesis variables a 1 , . . . , a n , such that each occurrence of them is of the form H ∀ αPi ai , where ∀ α P i is simply universal.
The class of quasi-closed terms is meaningful from a computational viewpoint, as explained in Section 4.
The System IL + EM ⋆ : a Leap into Non-Determinism
The aim of this section is to prove that each well-typed term of IL+EM is strongly normalizing. To this end, we make a detour into the magic world of non-determinism. The idea is to map IL + EM to a carefully defined non-deterministic variant IL + EM ⋆ , for which strong normalization is proven. The Strong Normalization Theorem for IL + EM will plainly follow as a corollary. A similar proof technique, inspired to [8] , an update of [6] .
We now introduce the non-deterministic system IL + EM ⋆ , which is still a standard natural deduction system for intuitionistic first-order logic with excluded middle. The only syntactical difference with the system IL + EM lies in the shape of proof terms, and is really tiny: the proof terms for EM and EM-hypotheses lose the hypothesis variables used to name them. Thus the grammar of untyped proof terms of IL + EM ⋆ is defined to be the following:
Grammar of Untyped Terms of IL + EM
where m ranges over terms of L, x over proof terms variables and A is either prenex with alternating quantifiers or simply universal.
The term assignment rules of IL + EM ⋆ are exactly the same of IL + EM, but for the ones for EM-hypotheses and EM, which just replace hypothesis variables a from the former proof terms:
Axioms Γ, a : ∀αA ⊢ H ∀αA : ∀αA Γ, a : ∃αA ⊢ W ∃αA : ∃αA
The reduction rules for the terms of IL + EM ⋆ are defined in Figure 3 and are those of the first two groups for IL + EM 1 , plus new non-deterministic rules for EM ⋆ and closure by context (with * we shall denote the reflexive and transitive closure of the one-step reduction ).
We explain now the non-deterministic part of the reduction rules. The reduction rule for H ∀αA says that, when the constant is active (i.e. applied to a closed term m ∈ L and ∀αA is closed) it is possible to replace an universal hypothesis ∀αA with an hypothesis A[m/α], denoted by the constant W A[m/α] , when A[m/α] is not propositional and thus of the shape ∃βB for some variable β and some universal formula B. The intuition behind the reduction rule for W ∃αA is the following: the term W ∃αA behaves as a "search" operator, which spans non-deterministically all first-order terms as possible witnesses of ∃αA ⊥ and makes the hypothesis that they are correct (these branches correspond to all the possible pairs (m, H A[m/α] )). The first two rules for the operator | | | | | | | | are standard reductions for the non deterministic choice operator (see [14, 13] ). The third rule, in joint with the reductions for H ∀αA and W ∃αA , is able to "simulate" the reductions of the deterministic u | | | | | | | | a v and, in particular, the exception substitution mechanism [a := n].
In the following, we define SN ⋆ to be the set of strongly normalizing proof terms with respect to the non-deterministic reduction . The reduction tree of a strongly normalizable term with respect to is no more finite, but still well-founded. It is well-known that it is possible to assign to each node of a well-founded tree an ordinal number, in such a way it decreases passing from a node to any of its sons. We will call the ordinal size of a term t ∈ SN ⋆ the ordinal number assigned to the root of its reduction tree and we denote it by h(t); thus, if t u, then h(t) > h(u). To fix ideas, one may define h(t) := sup{h(u) + 1 | t → u}.
Reduction Rules for IL 
where u − is the term obtained from u by replacing some occurrences of a subterm (H ∀αA )m with W A[m/α] (or with H A[m/α] when A is not existential)
Figure 3 Reduction Rules for IL + EM ⋆
We now define the obvious translation mapping untyped proof terms of IL + EM into untyped terms of IL + EM ⋆ , which just erases every occurrence of every EM-hypothesis variable a. Definition 6 (Translation of untyped proof terms of IL + EM into IL + EM ⋆ ). We define a translation _ * mapping untyped proof terms of IL + EM into untyped proof terms of IL + EM ⋆ : t * is defined as the term of IL + EM ⋆ obtained from t by erasing every EM hypothesis variable a.
We now show that the reduction relation for the proof terms of IL + EM ⋆ can easily simulate the reduction relation → for the terms of IL + EM. This is trivial for the proper reductions of IL and the permutative reductions for EM, while the reduction rules for the terms of the form u | | | | | | | | a v can be plainly simulated by with non-deterministic guesses. In particular, each reduction step between terms of IL + EM corresponds to at least a step between their translations: Proposition 7 (Preservation of the Reduction Relation → by ). Let v be any untyped proof term of IL + EM. Then v → w =⇒ v * + w * Proof. It is sufficient to prove the proposition when v is a redex r. We have several possibilities, almost all trivial, and we choose only some representative cases:
We verify indeed that
where u has some active subterm H ∀αA a m and n = (m, b)). We verify indeed -by choosing the appropriate reduction rule for | | | | | | | || | and applying the EM ⋆ reduction rules (H ∀αA )m 
Reducibility
We now want to prove the strong normalization theorem for IL + EM ⋆ : every term t which is typed in IL + EM ⋆ is strongly normalizable. We use a simple extension of the reducibility method of Tait-Girard [15] .
Definition 8 (Reducibility). Assume t is a term in the grammar of untyped terms of IL + EM ⋆ and C is a formula of L. We define the relation t r C ("t is reducible of type C") by induction and by cases according to the form of C: 
Properties of Reducible Terms
In this section we prove that the set of reducible terms for a given formula C satisfies the usual properties of a Girard reducibility candidate.
Following [15] , neutral terms are terms that are not "values" and need to be further computed.
Definition 9 (Neutrality). A proof term is neutral if it is not of the form λx u or λα u or u, t or ι i (u) or (t, u) or u | | | | | | | | v or H ∀αA . Definition 10 (Reducibility Candidates). Extending the approach of [15] , we define four properties (CR1), (CR2), (CR3), (CR4) of reducible terms t:
We now prove, as usual, that every term t possesses the reducibility candidate properties. The arguments for establishing (CR1), (CR2), (CR3), are in many cases standard (see [15] ). (CR3). Assume t is neutral and t t ′ implies t ′ r A → B. Suppose u r A; we have to show that tu r B. We proceed by induction on the ordinal height of the reduction tree of u (u ∈ SN ⋆ by induction hypothesis (CR1)). By induction hypothesis, (CR3) holds for the type B. So assume tu z; it is enough to show that z r B. If z = t ′ u, with t t ′ , then by hypothesis t ′ r A → B, so z r B. If z = tu ′ , with u u ′ , by induction hypothesis (CR2) u ′ r A, and therefore z r B by the induction hypothesis relative to the size of the reduction tree of u ′ . There are no other cases since t is neutral. 
. It is enough to show that either u * ι i (w) or v * ι i (w); this implies w r A i , and we are done. We proceed by triple induction on the number of bars in | | | | | | | || | and the ordinal heights of the reduction trees of u, v. Let us consider the first reduction step:
where u − is the term obtained from u by replacing some occurrences of a subterm (H ∀αA )m with W A[m/α] (or H A[m/α] ), then u u − . Therefore, by induction hypothesis applied to z, either v * ι i (w) or u − | | | | | | | || | v * ι i (w). In the first case, we are done; in the second, by induction hypothesis applied to u − | | | | | | | || | v, we obtain either u u − * ι i (w) or v * ι i (w), which completes the proof.
The next task is to prove that all introduction and elimination rules of IL + EM ⋆ define a reducible term from a list of reducible terms for all premises (Adequacy Theorem 13). 6. If r is the ∀I rule, then w = λαu, A = ∀αB and Γ ⊢ u : B (with α not occurring free in the formulas of Γ). So, w = λαu, since we may assume α = α 1 , . . . , α k . Let t be a term of L; by proposition 12), it is enough to prove that u[t/α] r B[t/α], which amounts to show that the induction hypothesis can be applied to u. For this purpose, we observe that, since α = α 1 , . . . , α k , for i = 1, . . . , n we have
If it is the EM ⋆ rule, then w = u | | | | | | | | v, Γ, a : ∀αB ⊢ u : C and Γ, a : ∃αB ⊥ ⊢ v : C and A = C. By induction hypothesis, u, v r C. By (CR4), we conclude w = (u | | | | | | | | v) r C.
Strong Normalization of IL + EM ⋆ and IL + EM
As corollary, one obtains strong normalization for IL + EM ⋆ .
Corollary 14 (Strong Normalization for IL
Proof. Assume Γ = x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , ∆ (∆ not containing declarations of proof-term variables). By (CR1), one has x i r A i , for i = 1, . . . , n. From Theorem 13, we derive that t r A. From (CR1), we conclude that t ∈ SN ⋆ .
The strong normalization of IL + EM ⋆ is readily turned into a strong normalization result for IL + EM, since the reduction → can be simulated by .
Corollary 15 (Strong Normalization for IL
Proof. By Proposition 7, any infinite reduction t = t 1 → t 2 → . . . → t n → . . . in IL + EM gives rise to an infinite reduction t * = t * 1 + t * 2 + . . . + t * n + . . . in IL + EM ⋆ . By the strong normalization Corollary 15 for IL + EM ⋆ and since clearly Γ ⊢ t * : A, infinite reductions of the latter kind cannot occur; thus neither of the former.
Back to IL + EM: Normal Form Property and Herbrand's Disjunction Extraction
In this section, we finally show that our exception-based Curry-Howard correspondence for classical logic is meaningful from the computational perspective. That is, not only every execution of every program we extract always terminates, but in the case of simply existential formulas ∃α P, any closed program of that type produces a complete finite sequence m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k of possible witnesses for ∃α P. This means that whatever first-order model we consider, there will be an i such that P[m i /α] is true in it. The result still holds whenever the program t is quasi-closed, which is to say, whenever ∃α P is proven by means of a simply universal theory: a 1 : ∀ α P 1 , . . . , a n : ∀ α P n ⊢ t : ∃α P In this case, for any first-order model of the formulas a 1 : ∀ α P 1 , . . . , a n : ∀ αP n , there will be an i such that P[m i /α] is true in it. Furthermore, by Subject Reduction, t will contain also a correctness certificate, in the sense that in the normal form of t one finds a proof-term for the formula P[m 1 /α] ∨ · · · ∨ P[m k /α]. In other terms, we have provided a new proof and a new Curry-Howard computational interpretation of Herbrand's Theorem. The fact that we consider as hypotheses only simply universal ones, i.e. universal formulas without occurrences of ∨, is by no means restrictive: by EM 0 , one can easily prove any propositional formula to be equivalent to a negative one, and thus to derive the former from the latter. In order to prove our results, we first carry out a simple inspection of the normal forms of the terms having propositional or simply existential type. The crucial observation is that every such term contains an exception ready to be raised: more precisely, it has a active subterm of the form H ∀αA a m, for some m ∈ L. From the logical point of view, this means that when one proves a formula of minimal complexity by means of a universal theory, one must use actively one of the universal hypotheses and obtain some concrete consequence of it. Such statements in first-order logic are typically drawn as consequences of the Subformula Property, but a much more primitive argument suffices here. This is indeed providential, since without permutation rules for ∨ and ∃, there will be no Subformula Property. Of course, we do have some permutation rules, namely those for the excluded middle: what is remarkable is that they are going to be enough. Nevertheless, if we think that in intuitionistic Logic or fragments of classical Arithmetic [7] general permutation rules are not needed to compute witnesses, it should not entirely come as a surprise that this is still the case in our framework.
Proposition 16 (Normal Form Property). Let P, P 1 , . . . , P n be negative propositional formulas. Suppose that Γ = x 1 : P 1 , . . . , x n : P n , a 1 : ∀α 1 A 1 , . . . , a m : ∀α m A m , propositional, we have that for each i, either t i is a closed term m i of L or t i is π j or Γ ⊢ t i : R, where R is a propositional formula. By induction hypothesis, each t i satisfies 1. and thus also t. 2. is obviously verified.
◭
If we omit parentheses, every normal proof-term can be written as v 0 | v 1 | . . . | v n , where each v i is not of the form u | v; if for every i, v i is of the form (m i , u i ), then we call the whole term a Herbrand normal form, because it is essentially a list of the witnesses appearing in a Herbrand disjunction. Formally: Definition 17 (Herbrand Normal Forms). We define by induction a set of proof terms, called Herbrand normal forms, as follows:
Every normal proof-term (t, u) is a Herbrand normal form; if u and v are Herbrand normal forms, u | v is a Herbrand normal form.
Our last task is to prove that all quasi-closed proofs of a simply existential statement ∃α P include an exhaustive sequence m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k of possible witnesses.
Theorem 18 (Herbrand Disjunction Extraction). Let ∃α P be any closed formula where P is negative. Suppose Γ ⊢ t : ∃α P, t is quasi-closed and t → * t ′ ∈ NF. Then Γ ⊢ t ′ : ∃α P and t ′ is a Herbrand normal form
Proof. We proceed by induction on t ′ . By the Subject Reduction Theorem 4, t ′ : ∃α P. By Proposition 16, t ′ can only have three possible shapes: 1. t ′ = u | | | | | | | | a v. We show that this cannot happen. First, a must occur free in u, otherwise t ′ / ∈ NF. By Proposition 16, we have two possibilities. i) Every occurrence in u of every term H ∀αiAi ai , with a i free, is of the active form H ∀αiAi ai m, where m ∈ L; in particular this is true when a i = a, which implies t ′ / ∈ NF. ii) u has a active subterm of the form H ∀αiAi ai m, for some non simply universal formula A i and m ∈ L: since t ′ is quasi-closed, a i = a, which again implies t ′ / ∈ NF. In any case, we have a contradiction. 2. t ′ = u | v; then, by induction hypothesis, u, v are Herbrand normal forms, and thus by definition 17, t ′ is an Herbrand normal form as well. 3. t ′ = (m, u); then, we are done. We have thus shown that t ′ is a Herbrand normal form (m 0 , u 0 ) | (m 1 , u 1 ) | . . . | (m k , u k ) Finally, we have that for each i, Γ i ⊢ u i : P[m i /α], for the very same Γ i that types (m i , u i ) of type ∃α P in t ′ . Therefore, for each i, Γ i ⊢ u + i : P[m 1 /α] ∨ · · · ∨ P[m k /α], where u + i is of the form ι i1 (. . . ι i k (u i ) . . .). We conclude that
We suggest to interpret an Herbrand normal form (m 0 , u 0 ) | (m 1 , u 1 ) | . . . | (m k , u k ) in the following way. Each (m i , u i ) represents the result of an intuitionistic computation of a witness in a possible universe; each time in an intuitionistic computation an exception is raised, a pair of alternative universes is generated. For each particular computation of each of the parallel universes to go through, one need to replace symbols of the form W ∃αA a with actual terms of L (those are the only symbols that can really block the computation). These witnesses have been obtained by communications coming from other intuitionistic computations in other parallel universes. It is that process of interaction and dialogue between different possible computations that generate the Herbrand normal forms.
